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We conduct experiments of a cheap-talk game with incomplete information in which one sender type has
an incentive to misrepresent her type. Although that Sender type mostly lies in the experiments, the Receiver
tends to believe the Sender’s messages. This conﬁrms “truth bias” reported in communication theory in a one-
shot, anonymous environment without nonverbal cues. These results cannot be explained by existing reﬁnement
theories, while a bounded rationality model explains them under certain conditions. We claim that the theory for
the evolution of language should address why truthful communication survives in the environment in which lying
succeeds.
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Verbal communication can occur even between senders and receivers with conﬂicting interests, and is often ac-
companied by lying and suspicion. Some communication-theoretic literature reports that, even in such situations,
although senders usually lie, most receivers believe senders’ messages; this is called “truth bias,” the receiver’s
intrinsic presumption that the senders are telling the truth (McCornack and Parks, 1986).
The purpose of this paper is to present experimental results of a cheap-talk game with incomplete information
in which one sender type has an incentive to misrepresent her type, conﬁrm the existence of truth bias, and ﬁnd out
a theoretical framework explaining this behavior. Kawagoe and Takizawa (1999) report the experimental results of
cheap-talk games with different payoff characteristics. They examine how communication between the Sender and
the Receiver is affected when the degree of preference alignment between them is changed, whereas the current
paper focuses on theoretical explanation for the experimental result in Game 3 experimented there1.
In a cheap-talk game with incomplete information, the Sender ﬁrst announces a message based on her private
information about her own type, and then the Receiver takes an action contingent on the Sender’s announcement.
The payoffs to both players are determined by the combination of the Sender’s type and the Receiver’s action,
and do not depend on the Sender’s message (thus costless communication). While the Receiver tries to guess the
Sender’s type via her message to choose the right action, the Sender wants to inﬂuence the Receiver’s choice of
action by her message. Thus this class of games can be regarded as the simplest possible representation of the
strategic interpersonal communication that may involve persuasion, lying, deception, believing, and suspicion.
To conduct experiments on this class of games, we make the games as simple as possible. Speciﬁcally, we
let the type space be T = {A,B} with the prior distribution being equiprobable for each type. The action space
for the Receiver is C = {X,Y,Z}. To consider the situation with common language, we let the message space
be M = {“I am type A”,“I am type B”} (we hereafter denote these messages by a and b respectively, as long as
no confusion may arise). Note that this message space creates the situation where each message corresponds to
truth-telling or lying.
In order to focus on cases of interest, we assume that X andY are the best action for the Receiver when Sender
types are A and B respectively. Z is introduced to identify the case where the Receiver’s belief over Sender types is
1Their experimental results including Game 1 and 2 are summarized in the Appendix B. They are also cited in Camerer (2003, Ch.7)
1nearlyequiprobable; it is thebest action for theReceiver when thebelief is near 1/2for both types 2. We sometimes
denote by (m1,m2) the Sender’s pure strategy to send message m1 in case of type A and m2 in case of type B, where
m1,m2 ∈ M, and denote by (c1,c2) the Receiver’s pure strategy to play c1 receiving message a and c2 receiving
message b.
Even these simplest possible settings encompass diverse incentive situations between the Sender and the Re-
ceiver. To specifythe payoffs of games used in theexperiments, Kawagoeand Takizawa (1999) adopt three general
incentive situations as follows:3
Case 1 Both Sender type A and B want to be correctly identiﬁed, inducing the Receiver to choose action X andY
respectively;
Case 2 Both Sender types want the Receiver to play Z, that is, they want to confuse the Receiver;
Case 3 Type A Sender wants to be correctly identiﬁed, while type B Sender wants to misrepresent herself as type
A.
Table 1 shows the payoffs of the games we actually used in our experiment. Rows indicate Sender types; columns
actions of the Receiver. The left number in each cell indicates the Sender’s payoff, while the right number the
Receiver’s.
Game 1 Game 2
Action Action
XYZ XYZ
type A 4, 4 1, 1 3, 3 type A 3, 4 2, 1 4, 3




type A 4, 4 1, 1 2, 3
B 3 ,1 2 ,4 4 ,3
Table 1: Cheap-talk Games Experimented in Kawagoe and Takizawa (1999)
As is well known, every cheap-talk game has an uninformative equilibrium in which Sender’s messages convey
no information about her true type, the so-called “babbling equilibrium.” Babbling equilibrium arises because all
2As will be explained in the Appendix B, the labels for the Receiver’s action we used in the experiments were A, B, and C for X, Y, and
Z respectively in Session 1, and they were permuted from Session 2 on. However, we will use X,Y,Z as indicated in the text throughout the
paper, because we need to classify the Receiver’s play according to his belief.
3See the Appendix A for more details.
2Sender types sending thesame message does not allow the Receiver to update his prior belief and theReceiver play
the best response to this distribution. Throughout the paper we will call an equilibrium play in which the Receiver
plays Z a babbling equilibrium, since, in our games, Z is introduced as the Receiver’s best response to the prior
distribution
Both Game 1 and Game 2 have separating equilibria in which each Sender type sends a distinct message and
the Receiver plays differently in best response to each message. Almost all the reﬁnement concepts mentioned in
Section 3 agree to predicting separating equilibrium plays for Game 1, and babbling equilibrium plays for Game 2
and 3. Kawagoe and Takizawa (1999) reports the following experimental results:4:
1. Quick convergence to a separating equilibrium play was observed in Game 1 ;
2. Game 2 also showed convergence to a separating equilibrium play;
3. In Game 3, Sender subjects tended to play (a,a), while Receiver subjects tended to play X or Z in response
to message a andY in response to b.
The current paper focuses on the last result above. The reason is fourfold. First, the experimental results of
their Game 3 can be regarded as an anomaly that cannot be explained by the standard equilibrium concepts, such
as sequential equilibrium, and their reﬁnements. Therefore, it is meaningful to ﬁnd out a theoretical framework
that can explain the data.
Second, the payoff structure of Game 3 is such that there is a conﬂict of interests between the Sender and
the Receiver as well as between Sender types. This can be regarded as an abstract situation that the study of
lying in communication theory has long focused on. Communication theory has so far focused its main attention
on the communication in richer environments with voice, facial expression and so on such as in face-to-face
conversation. However, the role of nonverbal cues in spotting a lie has now proven to be limited (Vrij, 2000),
and the focus of analysis has shifted to the controlled exchange of message per se rather than nonverbal cues.
Kawagoe and Takizawa (1999)’s experiment is also unique in the context of communication-theoretic literature
because it conﬁrms “truth bias,” a well-known phenomenon in communication-theoretic experiments, in a one-shot
anonymous environment with no nonverbal cues and simplest possible messages where the conﬂict of interests is
common knowledge between the Sender and the Receiver.
4For the experimental results in Game 1 and Game 2, see Tables 9 and 10 in the Appendix B. For Game 3, see Table 3 in Section 2 and
Table 11 in the Appendix B.
3Third, Game 3 is different from the cheap-talk games that have been closely examined in experimental studies
on cheap-talk games. For example, Dickhaut et al. (1995) and Game 1 and 2 in Kawagoe and Takizawa (1999)
show that informative communication arises when the Sender and the Receiver have common language and their
interest is sufﬁciently aligned, as is predicted by various reﬁnement theories. Blume et al. (1998a) also conduct
experiment on various cheap-talk games under common language to show that “partial common interests”(Rabin
andSobel,1996)gives agood predictionof actualplays in those games. However, our Game3doesnot have partial
common interests, and thus this concept does not have any force in predicting behaviors in it. Put differently, Game
3 is a good material for observing actual plays without partial common interests5.
Fourth, there seems to be a renewed interest in the working of communication among economists (Glazer and
Rubinstein, 2004; Crawford, 2003). However, to the best of our knowledge, there are few experimental results that
focus on the communication in conﬂicting situations. Yamamori et al. (2004) study how the cheap-talk preplay
communication affects the actual play in a dictator game, while the current paper focuses on communication in a
game with incomplete information.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the experimental procedures and presents the
experimental results. It is shown that Sender subjects tend to play (a,a) and Receiver subjects tend to play X or Z
in response to message a andY in response to message b. Section 3 examines the predictions of various reﬁnement
concepts developed for cheap-talk games. A new theoretical framework given by Stahl and Wilson (1995) and
Crawford (2003) is also considered and applied. It is shown that a speciﬁc application of Crawford (2003) to our
model with incomplete information can explain the experimental results. Section 5 summarizes the results, locate
the results in the communication-theoretic literature, and suggests future directions of research.
2 Experiments
As part of a series of cheap-talk game experiments, the third session at Kyoto Sangyo University on 14 July 1999
and the fourth session at Toyo University on 21 December 1999 were focused on Game 1 and 3. In these sessions,
half of the subjects who were assigned Game 3 repeatedly played that game only all over the rounds. The player’s
roles in the game, i.e., the Sender or the Receiver, and the opponent for each subject were not informed in advance
5Blume et al. (1998b) conducts experiments on cheap-talk games without common language to show that informative communication arises
when Senders’ and Receivers’ interests are sufﬁciently aligned, i.e., the meaning of signs evolves endogenously. See Crawford (1998) and
(Camerer, 2003, Ch.7) for a survey of cheap-talk game experiments.
4but were assigned, according to the schedule designed by the experimenters, in order to eliminate any repeated
game or reputation effect. The schedule was designed to guarantee that each subject played with different subject
in each round and experienced each player’s role as equally often possible. Subjects were also instructed that the
role and the opponent were randomly assigned in each round. Average reward was about three thousands yen in
the third session. In the fourth session, since the participation fee and the multiplier used to calculate a monetary
reward from the number of payoff was halved, the average reward also halved. Instructions and practice time took
about an hour and session time was about two hours in each session6.
Subjects were told that the experiment proceeded according to the steps described below.
1. In each round, subjects were shown payoff table of the game they face in the current round, and were told
whetherthey were the Sender or the Receiver. They could not know with whomthey are matched throughout
the session.
2. Assignment of games, roles in the games to each subject, and who matched with whom were randomly
determined.
3. In each room, twelve out of thirteen subjects actually participated (i.e. made decisions) in the experiment
and one subject waited until the next round7.
4. The Sender was assigned one of two types, “A” or “B,” randomly with probability 1/2. The Sender type
was only shown to the Sender and the Receiver could not know the Sender’s type before the payoffs for both
subjects were determined.
5. The Sender was told to choose between two messages, “I am type A” or “I am type B.”
6. The Receiver was shown the Sender’s message and was told to choose one of three actions, A, B,o rC.
7. Payoffs for both players were determined by the Sender’s true type and the Receiver’s action according to
the payoff tables. After all subjects had made decision, the Sender’s true type, the sent message, and the
action taken by the Receiver, payoffs for both were revealed separately on the blackboard.
8. A session consisted of thirteen rounds.
6The detailed descriptions of experimental procedures, including those for Game 1 and 2, are shown in Appendix B, C, and D.
7This is because of the nature of matching procedure we adopted. We devised random matching so that each subject plays both player roles
and both Sender types as equally often as possible, matched with different subject at each round.
59. In the direct reward condition, rewardwas calculated as ﬁfty times the sum of payoffs earned by each subject
throughout the session and paid to her/him in cash. Participation fee was also given to each subject.
10. Prior to the actual experiment, three rounds of practice experiment were conducted, where equilibria and
payoffs of the games were different from those used in the actual experiment. Payoffs earned in these
practice rounds did not count for ﬁnal reward calculation.
The above procedure was also explained in the written instructions8.
Next we show our experimental results with respect to outcomes predicted by sequential equilibria. As we
noted, there exists no sequential equilibrium other than babbling equilibria (all the sequential equilibria are shown
in Table 5).
Table 2 shows the frequency of pure strategy babbling equilibrium plays and the other out of equilibrium
outcomes. Recall that we regard the outcome in which the Receiver played Z as babbling equilibrium.
Session 3 Session 4 Total
Babbling equilibria 43 35 78
out of equilibrium plays 35 43 78
Total 78 78 156
Table 2: The Frequency of Equilibrium Play in Game 3
One can easily observe from Table 2 that pure strategy babbling equilibria were played about half the time (43
(35) out of 78 times in Session 3 (4)). Figure 1 and Figure 2 also show time series data of babbling equilibria and
out of equilibrium plays. These ﬁgures clearly shows no tendency of convergence to the pure strategy babbling
equilibria.
Thus, equilibrium plays were not observed as frequently as expected. Next, we would like to show the data
arranged by each information set in order to consider which player, the Sender or the Receiver, deviated from
equilibrium plays. See Table 3.
Sender Receiver
t = A t = B m = a m = b
a b a b X Y Z X Y Z
Session 3 31 8 27 12 19 4 35 3 9 8
Session 4 33 6 27 12 21 9 31 2 11 5
Total 64 14 54 24 40 13 66 5 20 13
Table 3: Data Arranged by Information Set in Each Session





















Observed Plays in Game 3: Session 3
Babbling Equilibria
Others


















Observed Plays in Game 3: Session 4
Babbling Equilibria
Others
Figure 2: Time series data for Game 3 (Session 4)
The Sender and the Receiver’s choice frequencies in each session shown in Table 3 are also depicted in Figures
3 and4. Apparently from these ﬁgures, mostSenders of both types tended to send message a in both sessions. That
is, their plays were almost consistent with a pure strategy babbling equilibrium. On the other hand, the Receivers
receiving message a tended to choose action Z most frequently and X with the second frequency, and the Receivers
receiving message b action Y with the most and Z with the second frequency. One can see from these results that
the Receivers who received message b tended to regard the message truthful to choose action Y as a best response.
The Receivers who received message a also tended to regard the message truthful in a certain proportion. Hence it
is clear that the Receiver’s behavior was the main reason for the deviation from pure strategy babbling equilibria
in our experiments.
















































Receivers’ Actions in Session 3
message a
type b
















































Receivers’ Actions in Session 4
message a
type b
Figure 4: Plays in Session 4
while to see the relation between plays as the Sender and plays as the Receiver in each individual’s behavior. We
now turn to each individual’s data in Session 49. Table 4 gives choice frequency of thirteen subjects, arranged by
the cases that they were the Sender or the Receiver.
The data allow us to identify several prominent patterns in the subjects’ behaviors. As for the the Sender, two
types can be identiﬁed: aa type who sent message a regardless of the types, and ab type who sent message a in the
case of type A and b in the case of type B. As for the Receiver, there were three types: ZZ type who chose action Z
regardless of messages, XY type who chose action X upon receipt of message a and chose action Y with message
b, and XY  type who had a mixed characteristics of both ZZ and XY types. Other subjects’ behaviors are difﬁcult
to characterize.
Among the thirteen subjects, Subject No.13 was the only subject who was aa type and ZZ type when he was
sender and receiver respectively, namely, who played according to a pure strategy babbling equilibrium. Subject
No.2 was also the only subject who was ab type and XY type when he was sender and receiver respectively,
namely, who played as a truth-teller/believer. The most interesting were the subjects who were the aa-type Sender
9Unfortunately, the individual data in Session 3 were lost.
8As sender As receiver















Total 33 6 27 12 21 9 31 21 1 5
Table 4: Individual Behaviors in Session 4
and XY -type Receiver. That is, these players had quite similar characteristics as shown in the aggregated data.
Four players, subjectsNo.5, 7, 8 and 9, belonged to this class. They are subjects who tended to believe thesenders’
message to be truthful while they chose messages to hide their types when they were senders. Anyway, except for
subjects who were not easily classiﬁed, about half of the subjects tended to believe senders’ message.
3 Theoretical Predictions
This section reviews various equilibrium reﬁnement concepts developed for cheap-talk games with incomplete
information, and examines the prediction of those concepts for the play in Game 3.
3.1 Sequential Equilibrium and its Reﬁnements
Recall that the type space T = {A,B}, the message space M = {a,b}, the action space C = {X,Y,Z}, and the
prior distribution is π(A)=π(B)=1/2 in our game. Figure 5 depicts the game tree of Game 3. Let p (q) be the
probability for the type A (B) Sender to send message a. Also let r1,r2,r3 (s1,s2,s3) denote the probability for the
Receiver receiving message a (b) to play X,Y and Z respectively. β(A|m) denotes the Receiver’s belief that the
Sender is type A after receiving message m. Table 5 shows all the sequential equilibria in Game 310. In all the
sequential equilibrium in the table, the outcome function o : T →C is constant valued with o(t)=Z for all t ∈ T,






3,p+q = 0,p+q = 2.
9that is, babbling equilibria. In this game, if a strategy proﬁle is an equilibrium, then another strategy proﬁle in
which the role of messages is interchanged for both Sender and Receiver is also an equilibrium. Equilibria 1 and
1 , 2 and 2  as well as 3 and 3  in Table 5 indicate such pairs.
First of all, let us comparethe experimentaldata in theprevious section with thepredictions given by sequential
equilibria. Since most Senders play (a,a)in the experiment, we may focus attention to equilibria 1, 2 and 3  where
the Sender plays (a,a). It may appear that 1 or 3  is close to the experimental data because the aggregated data of
the Receiver’s action appear to show that the Receivers tend to play (Z,Y). However, closely inspecting table 4,
there is no subject who played (Z,Y) and the Receivers usually play the mixture of X and Z receiving message a
andY receiving message b. The remarkable point here is that the Receiver plays X in response to message a in an
unignorable proportion, which never constitutes a sequential equilibrium in this game.






























Figure 5: Extensive form of Game 3
pq β(A|a)( r1,r2,r3) β(A|b)( s1,s2,s3) outcome
(1) 11 1
2 (0,0,1)[ 0, 1
3]( 0,1,0)( Z,Z)














(3)  11 1
2 (0,0,1) 1
3 (0,s2,s3)( Z,Z)
(4) pq[1/3,2/3]( 0,0,1)[ 1/3,2/3]( 0,0,1)( Z,Z)
Table 5: Sequential Equilibria in Game 3
That there is no sequential equilibria explaining experimental data means that any equilibrium reﬁnement
10concept does not provide any plausible explanation. See the Appendix E for the various equilibrium concepts
we examined. However, among others, Rabin and Sobel (1996)’s argument of deviation dynamics seems to be
relevant to the explanation for our experimental data. To appreciate this, it is worthwhile to review the basic idea
of equilibrium reﬁnement for cheap-talk games with incomplete information.
Roughly put, the argument of reﬁnement theories for cheap-talk games runs as follows:
1. Pick an equilibrium;
2. In this equilibrium, a subset K of Sender types sends a message that is not used in the equilibrium;
3. Tentatively suppose that the Receiver believes this message, updates his belief accordingly, and acts opti-
mally in response to the new message. Let K  denote the set of types that can earn a higher payoff with
the induced action of the Receiver than in the original equilibrium payoff. If K = K , the new message is
regarded as credible;
4. If there is no credible messages for deviation, the original equilibrium can be said to be robust.
This argument usually assumes that the message space is sufﬁciently large that a new message is always available
for potential deviant types. Also note that this test for robustness returns the same result for two different equilibria
with the same outcome function, because it only checks if it is possible for any type to have higher payoff than the
original payoff.
Now let us see how this test works for our Game 3. First pick equilibrium ((a,a),(Z,Z)) for instance. In this
equilibrium, type A Sender earns 2, type B gets 4, and the Receiver obtains 3 regardless of the type he matches.
Suppose that type A Sender sends a new message other than awith themeaning “I am type A” andthat the Receiver
believes this, and play X in response to this message. Type A Sender will earn 4, which is higher than the original
payoff, while type B Sender, if she sends the same message as type A, obtains 3, which is lower than the original
payoff. Therefore the set of types who can beneﬁt from this deviation attempt is {A} and the new message for
deviation is credible. Thus the original equilibrium, therefore all the sequential equilibria in table 5, is not robust.
This way of checking robustness is always plagued by the following criticism that is called Stiglitz critique
(Cho and Kreps, 1987; Mathews et al., 1991; Rabin and Sobel, 1996). Suppose that, as the result of deviation as
above, type A Sender sends a new message and the Receiver believes it. It is too early to stop the argument there.
The Receiver receiving the original message will necessarily deduce that the message is from type B Sender. As
11a result, he will play Y in response to message a, bringing type B Sender 2. Then, however, type B Sender will
ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to use the same new message used by type A and the Receiver will now optimally play Z in
response to the new message as in the original equilibrium.
Mathews et al. (1991) respond to this criticism by making the requirements for a valid deviation announce-
ment more stringent. If there is an equilibrium in which type A and type B use different messages, the deviation
announcement by type A can be regarded as announcement of her intention to play a new equilibrium. In this equi-
librium, it is not optimal for type B to use the same message as used by type A, and the deviation announcement
by type A can be justiﬁed. In other words, they required the deviation announcement by type A constitute a part of
another equilibrium. Rabin and Sobel (1996) pushes ahead with this idea and proposes to consider the dynamics
triggered by deviation announcement more explicitly.
Considera game N,{Si}i∈N,{ui}i∈N andletσ∗ =(σ∗
1,σ∗
2) beanequilibriumof thisgame. Pickanequilibrium
reﬁnement theory and let the set of possible deviations from this equilibrium according to the theory be denoted by
Q(σ∗)=(Q1,Q2). Next construct a deviation correspondence by adding best responses to the deviation as follows.
First let Zj ⊆ ∆(Sj) denote a set of mixed strategies for player j and let SBRi(Zj) be the set of pure strategies in
Si that can be a best response to some distribution over Zj that assigns positive probability to each element in Zj.
Deﬁne the ﬁrst step of deviation dynamics as follows:
Σi(0)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
σ∗
i if Qi = / 0
Qi if Qi  = / 0.
Using this, further deﬁne
Σi(n)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨




Σi(n−1)∪SBRi(∆(Σ−i(n−1)) if Σ−i(n−1) = σ∗
−i.
If Si is ﬁnite, there exists some n∗ such that for every i and every k, Σi(n∗)=Σi(n∗+k), which we denote as Σ∗
i .
A deviation correspondence is (Σ∗
S,Σ∗
R) thus constructed, and is denoted by D(σ∗). The set of equilibria in D(σ∗)
be denoted by ED(σ∗). A stable equilibrium σ∗ with respect to the reﬁnement theory sastiﬁes D(σ∗)={σ∗}
by deﬁnition. They weaken this condition to deﬁne a quasi-stable equilibrium by ED(σ∗)={σ∗}. They further
12consider the dynamics among equilibria triggered by a deviation. A set of equilibria E is said to be a recurrent set
if ED(σ) ⊆E for every σ ∈E and it is the minimal set among the set satisfying this condition. Each element in a
recurrent set is said to be a recurrent equilibrium.
Let us now return to our game and consider how a deviation process evolves11. Suppose ﬁrst that equilibrium
((b,b),(·,Z)) is played. Since message a is off the equilibrium path and the Receiver’s best response depend
on his belief upon receiving a, we do not specify his play here. Suppose next that type A Sender succeed in
making the Receiver believe it is type A by sending message a. We thus have the ﬁrst step in the deviation
dynamics, ΣS(0)=( a,b),ΣR(0)=( X,Z). This further evolves as ΣS(1)={(a,b)}, ΣR(1)={(X,Z),(X,Y)},
ΣS(2)={(a,b),(a,a)}, ΣR(2)={(X,Z),(X,Y)}, ΣS(3)={(a,b),(a,a)}, ΣR(3)={(X,Z),(X,Y),(Z,·)}. See
also Figure 6. This means that all the pure strategy sequential equilibria in Table 5 forms a recurrent set and all the
pure strategy equilibria are recurrent equilibria. However, it is worth noting that ((a,b),(X,Y)) and ((a,a),(X,Y))




















Figure 6: A Deviation Dynamics in Game 3
Restricting focus on cheap-talk games, Rabin and Sobel (1996) deﬁnes a game with“partial common interests”
to characterize recurrent equilibria by the payoff structure. A cheap-talk game is said to have partial common
interests if there exists a partition J1,···,Jj of the type space T such that the following three conditions hold.
1. Suppose the Receiver Bayes-updates the prior distribution, knowing the Sender’s type is in Ji, and choose a
best response. Then every type ti ∈ Ji earns strictly higher payoff than in the babbling equilibrium.
11We apply Farrell (1993)’s neologism-proofness concept here. However, the following argument does not change even if we consider
Mathews et al. (1991)’s weakly coredible announcement or credible announcement. See the Appendix E for the details of these concepts
132. For every type in Ji, the minimum payoff she obtains when the Receiver chooses a best action to some belief
concentrated on Ji is strictly greater than the maximum payoff she obtains when the Receiver chooses a best
action to some belief concentrated on Jk(k  = i).
3. Suppose L satisﬁes L∩Tk for at least two k’s. Then there exists some type ti ∈ L∩Jk whose minimum payoff
she obtains when the Receiver with belief concentrated on Jk choose a best response is strictly greater than
the maximum payoff she obtains when the Receiver with belief concentrated on L chooses a best response.
Rabin and Sobel (1996) shows that, in a game with partial common interests, a babbling equilibrium is not
recurrent with respect to the concept of weakly credible announcement deﬁned by Mathews et al. (1991). So
players will not play a babbling equilibrium forever. Blume et al. (1998a)’s experimental study conﬁrms the
validity of the concept of partial common interests. It is easy to see that our Game 3 violates the condition 2
above. Thus, our Game 3 does not have partial common interests and every pure strategy sequential equilibrium is
recurrent.
To summarize, the existing reﬁnement theories for cheap-talk game cannot explain our experimental results
12. The most intriguing part of those discussions is that the strategy proﬁle ((a,a),(X,Y)) and ((a,b),(X,Y))
appears in a deviation dynamics proposed by Rabin and Sobel (1996). The next subsection considers a theoretical
framework that take into consideration such off the equilibrium plays.
3.2 A Model with Boundedly Rational Types
Crawford (2003) analyses agamethat rationalplayersplay believing thattheiropponent may beboundedly rational
types with some probability, to explain how the Allies succeeded in thwarting German army’s expectation in the
Operation Fortitude (D-day). His model is basically the same as the well studied models with some behavioral
types as in Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982). However, while these preceding papers
are concerned with the set of equilibria as the fraction of boundedly rational behavioral types approaches zero,
Crawford (2003) focuses on equilibria when there is substantial probability that the opponent is of boundedly
rational types. Since the game he analyzes has the structure that players try to outguess the opponent’s play and
12McKelveyand Palfrey(1995,1998)propose an equilibrium conceptwith noisy bestresponse,called Quantal Response Equilibrium(QRE),
assuming that players play an action with higher payoff with higher probability, but the play is always accompanied by noise. We examined
how this concept faresto explain our data. However, it turned out that this concept is plagued by multiplicity when applied to cheap-talk games.
We are preparing another paper for the detailed analysis of QRE in our games.
14every strategy is a best response to some strategy of the opponent, it is also an application of Stahl and Wilson
(1995)’s model that presumes the existence of players with various level of bounded rationality.
We ﬁrst have to decide on the boundedly rational types to be considered in our game. Recall now that
the message space in our game is intentionally made “na¨ ive” to create the situation where each message corre-
sponds to truth-telling or lying. On the Sender’s side, we focus attention on the following two strategies among
(a,a),(a,b),(b,a),(b,b)of Sender’s pure strategies.
(a,a) pooling type: tells the truth when she is type A and pretends to be type A when type B.
(a,b) separating type: always tells the truth.
Note that our messages have literal meaning in themselves and are easily identiﬁed as truth-telling or lying. Note
also, while type B has an incentive to pretend to be type A, type A has no such an incentive. These considerations
led us to exclude bb and ba. In fact, there is no subject who sent b when type A and sent a when type B. Let sp
and st denote the probabilities for the Sender to be pooling and separating types respectively. Let the probability
for the Sender to be rational (sophisticated) be denoted by ss. We assume that sp +st +ss = 1 and sp,st,ss > 0.
The Receiver’s pure strategies are (X,X),(X,Y),(X,Z),(Y,X),(Y,Y),(Y,Z),(Z,X),(Z,Y) and (Z,Z). Among
these, (X,X) and (Y,Y) are never best responses. In choosing plausible boundedly rational strategies, we focus
on whether the Receiver believes the Sender’s message to be truthful or not. The strategy to believe the Sender’s
message to be truthful is (X,Y). To question the credibility of message a is also a plausible strategy, since only
type B has an incentive to tell a lie making message a incredible. Among the candidate strategies witha form (Z,·),
we choose to pick (Z,Y). Thus boundedly rational types we decided to consider are the following two types.
(X,Y) na¨ ive type: believes both messages to be truthful.
(Z,Y) suspicious type: disbelieves only message a.
Let rb and ri denote the probability for the Receiver to be na¨ ive type and suspicious type respectively. Also let rs
be the probability for the Receiver to be sophisticated. We assume rb+ri +rs = 1 and rb,ri,rs > 0.
Suppose now that a sophisticated Sender and a sophisticated Receiver play the game, believing that the oppo-
nent is boundedly rational types with some probability. As an example, suppose that the sophisticated Sender plays
aa, while the sophisticated Receiver plays XY. On the Sender’s side, the pooling type and the separating type of
type A, and the sophiticated Sender of both types A and B are sending message a. Therefore the probability for
15the sophisticated Receiver to receive message a is 1
2st +sp +ss = 1− 1
2st, and the conditional probability that the
Sender’s true type is A and B upon receiving a is 1
2−st and 1−st
2−st respectively. Thus the Receiver’s expected payoff











Similarly, the probability of receiving message b is calculated as 1
2st and the conditional probability that the
Sender’s true type is A and B upon receiving b is 0 and 1 respectively. Therefore the Receiver’s expected pay-
off when he plays Y upon receiving b is 4. Taken together, the expected payoff to the sophisticated Receiver when











On the other hand, the sophisticated Sender who plays aa is faced with X with probability rb+rs, with Z with
probability ri. Thus when she is type A, she obtains 4 with probability rb+rs and 2 with probability ri, while she






(3(rb +rs)+4ri)=3.5(rb+rs)+3ri = 3+0.5(rb+rs).
Thus calculated expected payoffs to the sophisticated Sender and the sophisticated Receiver for all the possible
pure strategy proﬁles are shown in Table 6. The left number refers to the payoff to the Receiver, the right number
the Sender. Note that both messages a and b are necessarily used with positive probability, because of the presence
of boundedly rational types.
Table 7summarizes all the purestrategy sequential equilibria of thegamebetween the sophisticatedSender and
Receiver. Note equilibria ((a,a),(Z,Y)) and ((a,a),(X,Y)) exist with no restrictions on rb or rs; ((a,a),(Z,Y))
arises when st < 1/2 and ((a,a),(X,Y)) when st > 1/2. The other two equilibria arise with strong restrictions on
rb and rs, and only if st < 1/3. Equilibria ((a,a),(Z,Y)) and ((a,a),(X,Y)) are also relevant to our experimental
results. In these equilibria, the type A Sender tells the truth, while the type B Sender tells a lie, which coincides
with the Senders’ behaviors in our experimental data. On the Receiver’s side, the Receiver believes or disbelieves



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































17results13. These equilibria not only show that the sophisticated Receiver can play X in the face of message a,b u t
also that that he plays Y for sure upon receiving message b.
Equilibria Conditions for Parameters
(aa,XY) st > 1/2
(aa,ZY) st < 1/2
(ba,ZX) 2ss−1 < st < 0.5ss,rb < 1.5rs−0.5
(ba,YX) st < 2ss−1,rb < 2−3rs,rb < 2rs−0.5
Table 7: Pure Strategy Sequential Equilibria
Equilibrium ((a,a),(X,Y)) arises when the sophisticated Receiver believes that the Sender is a separating type
with substantial probability, even if the sophisticated Sender plays (a,a). Thus what is important is the Receiver’s
belief that the Sender is a boundedly rational type with some probability. This assumption seems to be plausible
when we consider a one-shot game. However, it is not clear why the sophisticated players continue to believe that
boundedly rational types are present in the opponent players in the long run supporting the above equilibria. This
question seems to await further analysis with the evolutionary formulation. Potentially important for such analyses
are the payoffs that those boundedly rational types earn in the equilibria. In both((a,a),(X,Y)) and((a,a),(Z,Y)),
the pooling type (a,a) earns the same payoff as the sophisticated Sender, while the payoff to the separating type
ab is lower than that to the sophisticated Sender. In equilibrium ((a,a),(X,Y)),n a ¨ ive type (X,Y) earns as mush as
the sophisticated Receiver and in equilibrium ((a,a),(Z,Y)), suspicious type obtains as much as the sophisticated
Receiver.
4 Concluding Remarks
4.1 Summary of the Experimental Results and Analysis
We conducted, and presented the result of, experiments of a cheap-talk game with incomplete information in
which one sender type has an incentive to misrepresent her type. The game can be regarded as representing a
simplest possible situation of communication with conﬂicting interests: it has two possible types and two possible
messages for the Sender, and three actions for the Receiver; a common language is shared between the Sender
and the Receiver; and the message space is intentionally made “na¨ ive” to create the situation where each message
13As is stated in the previous section, there is no subject who played ZY in the experimental data. They usually played the mixture of X and
Z upon receiving a. However, it is conceivable that the subject adopted XY and ZY as their belief ﬂuctuates.
18corresponds to truth-telling or lying.
The experimental results reported and analyzed in this paper are different from the existing literature. Accord-
ing to the previously reported experimental results of cheap-talk games under a common language environment,
the concept of “partial common interests” has proven to give a good prediction of actual plays in those games.
However, the concept of partial common interests does not give a sharp prediction for our Game 3 because there
is no partition of the type space in which all the Sender types in each partition set feels comfortable belonging to
that set. Our game is a good material for exploring what behaviors the Sender and the Receiver show in a game
without partial common interests.
It was observed that the Sender type with an incentive to misrepresent her type mostly lied, leading to the
loss of credibility of the Sender’s messages. This is not particularly surprising since it is consistent with the
Sender’s strategy in a sequential equilibrium of the game. The most surprising part of our experimental results
is that although the credibility of messages was lost, the Receivers mostly believed the Senders’ messages to be
truthful. As we examined in Section 3, these results cannot be explained by the existing reﬁnement concepts
such as neologism-proofness, while the model incorporating some fraction of boundedly rational types, recently
proposed by Crawford (2003) and Stahl and Wilson (1995), explains these results under certain conditions.
4.2 Relation to the Communication-Theoretic Literature
Our experimental results also seem to be relevant to a ﬁeld of communication theory that has studied ly-
ing/deception. As stated above, one sender type have an incentive to misrepresent her type in the game we study.
It is then of interest to us whether the Sender actually lies and/or whether the Receiver succeeds in spotting lies.
In this sense, we share some interest with communication researchers, although our experimental environment is
unique in the sense to be stated more precisely below.
In order to locate our experiments in the context of communication theory, it would be worthwhile to brieﬂy
review the communication-theoretic literature on deception14. Previous research in communication theory that
has focused on deception has centered on nonverbal behaviors associated with uncontrollable psychological pro-
cesses (Vrij, 2000). However, these studies show that various nonverbal cues, such as the pitch of a voice and
eye movement, are not necessarily reliable signs for detecting deception, and even well-trained specialists cannot
14See Grifﬁn (2003, Ch.7) for a survey of the interpersonal deception theory and its variants.
19distinguish between truth-telling and lies with more than 60% accuracy rate (Burgoon et al., 1996). In an alert and
suspicious environment, a truth teller’s adaptation to a false accusation strikes the respondent as devious, which is
called “Othello error”(Ekman, 1985).
To advance deception studies a step further, certain communication theorists have turned their focus on verbal
behaviors or controlled message activity in the laboratory and classiﬁed several types of deceptive messages. There
seem to be two approaches in this strand of study: thinking of deceptive messages as distinct strategies, or thinking
of deceptive messages as message forms resulting from the manipulation of information in different way.
Among the researchers who have taken the latter approach, McCornack (1992), based on Grice (1989)’s “co-
operative principle,” deﬁnes deception as a violation of one or more maxims of the cooperative principle, and
proposes Information Manipulating Theory (IMT). Buller and Burgoon (1996) independently proposes a similar
theory, Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT), based on two-way communication model as a criticism against pre-
vious communication research that has considered one-way communication. Three major categories of deceptive
message, falsiﬁcation, concealment and equivocation, are identiﬁed by these theories according to the amount of
information contained in the message.
On the other hand, McCornack and Parks (1986) coined the word “truth bias,” the presistent presumption that
the partners are telling the truth. As part of a hypothesis that the relational development leads to decreases in
the accuracy of deception detection, McCornack and Parks (1986) propose the hypothesis that increases in the
conﬁdence in truth/lie judgement lead to increases in the presumption of honesty, truth bias. The subjects of their
experiment were premarital romantic couples with varying degree of relational development. One partner was
asked to tell the truth or lie about several questions with some explanation, and this was recorded in a videotape.
The other partner was shown this vedeotape containing a series of truthful and deceptive statements, and was told
to give truth/lie judgement. They conﬁrmed the existence of truth bias in this environment.
Our experimental results also conﬁrm the existence of the “truth bias,” but in quite a distinct environment from
theirs. First, our experiment was conducted in a one-shot anonymous environment with no room for relational
development. Second, there was no nonverbal cues available to the Receiver, and the Sender was restricted to
use the simplest possible messages. Third, the situations (the game structure and payoffs) were made common
knowledge between the Sender and the Receiver in our experiment. Matching was designed so that all subjects
experience both player’s roles and both Sender types as equally often as possible. So, they should be able to
20understand the strategic situation they face both as the Sender and the Receiver. Fourth, in our experiment, the
Sender strategically chose to tell the truth or lie.
Note especially the ﬁrst and the third point above. That truth biaswas observed even in this enviromnent means
that truth bias was conﬁrmed in a very strong sense. Without any relational development and with the conﬂicting
situation being common knowledge, truth bias exists as long as common language are shared between the Sender
and theReceiver, which may be called “fundamental truth bias.” Althoughthe Receiver can infer from the situation
that the Sender may lie, he may be deceived by her message.
Our experimental results are also related to “truth detection bias.” Burgoon et al. (1996)’s experimental results
show that falsiﬁcation is mostdifﬁcult to detect, while equivocation is easiest to detect. Burgoon et al. (1994) show
that for novices as well as experts, such as military intelligence instructors, accuracy rate of detection was much
higher on truthful messages than on deceptive ones. This is called ”truth detecting bias,” a well-known but still
disputable phenomenon (Vrij, 2000; Holm, 2004). We can also measure the rate of truth and lie detection in our
experimental data, but no conclusive conclusion can be drawn15.
4.3 Future Direction of Research
The modelproposed by Crawford (2003) explains our experimental results rather well. However, there remains the
question why boundedly rational types in the model could persist in the long run. To answer this question, we need
to develop another evolutionary model that involves conﬂicting interests between the Sender and the Receiver.
Although, in theeconomicandgame-theoreticliterature, Matui (1991),W¨ arneryd (1993),Blumeetal. (1998b),
Rubinstein (2000, Ch.2) and others have made attempts to model the evolution of meaning of a language, they only
considered the situation with common interests between the Senders and the Receivers. The experimental results
and analysis presented in the paper suggest that theoretical explanation for the evolution of language should take
into account the situation with conﬂicting interests and should address why truthful communication survives in the
environment in which lying is successful. We might be able to have a different picture of the evolution of language
if we do so. Our language may be necessarily vague as a result of the equilibrium of this process (Lipman, 2001).
15We say that truth-telling is detected if the type A Sender sends message a and the Receiver responds with action X or if the type B Sender
sends message b and the Receiver responds with action Y. Similarly, we say that a lie is detected if the type A Sender sends message b and the
Receiver responds with action X and if the type B Sender sends message a and the Receiver responds with action Y. Then, for type A Senders,
truth were detected in 12 out of 39 cases in Session 3 and 16 out of 39 cases in Session 4, and lies were detected 0 out 39 cases in Session 3
and 2 out of 39 cases in Session 4. For type B Senders, truth were detected in 7 out of 39 cases in Session 3 and 1 out of 39 cases in Session 4,
and lies were detected 11 out of 39 cases in session 3 and 11 out of 39 cases in Session 4. Thus, as the frequency of truth and lies detection are
asymmetric for type A and B, we cannot say that neither detection bias was observed clearly.
21A key could be the basic idea in Grice (1989)’s cooperative principle that communication is an attempt to de-
termine truth value through the statements made in conversation and the conversation is intrinsically a cooperative
task. Another research will be needed to explore this point, however.
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25Appendices
The purpose of these appendices is to cover the points that we could not touch on in detail in the text. Section
A shows the characterization of the three games used in our experiment within a general framework of cheap-
talk games with two types and three actions. Section B explains more details of the experiments we conducted,
including the experimental results for Game 1 and 2 as well as the experimental data for Game 3 in Sessions 1-
2. The instructions and the recording sheet for direct reward condition we used in the experiments are found in
Sections C and D. Finally Section E explains reﬁnement theories for cheap-talk games in more depth than in the
text.
A Characterization of the Three Games Used in the Experiments
Even the simplest possible cheap-talk game with two types and three actions can encompasses diverse incentive
situations between the Sender and the Receiver. Two distinct dimensions of incentives seems to be identiﬁed in
this setting, although they are closely related to each other. On the one hand, each Sender type may or may not
have aligned preference over actions with the Receiver. On the other hand, each Sender type may or may not prefer
to disguise herself as a different type.
To see this point more clearly, it is instructive to look at the payoff functions adopted by Crawford and Sobel
(1982). In their model, the payoff to the Sender of type t from the Receiver’s action y is −(y−(t +d))2 and the
Receiver’s payoff is −(y−t)2, where t is drawn from the unit interval. This is a situation where the Receiver
wants to choose action that is equal to the Sender’s type, while the Sender wants the Receiver to take an action that
equals to the sum of his type and d. Thus d is a single parameter that expresses the degree of preference alignment
between the Sender and the Receiver. Note that d is a constant, which means all the Sender types have the same
incentives to be regarded as a type that is larger than the true type by d. Their analysis concentrated on how the
alignment of preferences inﬂuences equilibrium behavior in cheap-talk games, abstracting away the interaction
between different Sender types.
We wanted to study situations with a more complicated incentive interaction between different Sender types.
Suppose, in a generic cheap-talk game with two types and three actions, each type has strict (ordinal) preference
relation over the set of Receiver’s actions. Since each Sender type has six possibilities of such preference relation,
26there are thirty-six possible combinations of both types’ preference relations. Focusing on the possibly different
incentive of each Sender type to represent herself, we decided to consider three basic cases as follows:
Case 1 Both type A and B want to be correctly identiﬁed, inducing the Receiver to choose X and Y respectively;
Case 2 Both types want the Receiver to play Z, that is, they want to confuse the Receiver;
Case 3 Type A wants to be correctly identiﬁed, while type B wants to misrepresent herself as type A.
Thus, based on Crawford and Sobel’s payoff functions, we created three cheap-talk games that correspond to
the above cases by making d type-dependent as in Blume et al. (1998a). We discretized the type space of Crawford
and Sobel such that t = 1/4 for type A and t = 3/4 for type B. Then, Case 1 can be characterized by setting d = 0
for both types. While Case 2 can be created by setting d =1/4 for type A and d = −1/4 fot type B, in Case 3 d =0
for type A and d = −1/3 for type B. See Figure 7. Thus obtained payoffs were converted by afﬁne transformation
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Figure 7: Incentives of different types
B Details of Experiments
Our experiment consists of four sessions, which were conducted at different time and location and with different
subjects. In the ﬁrst session, we carefully followed the procedure adopted by Cooper et al. (1992b) and Cooper
et al. (1992a). Although they only deal with cheap-talk games with complete information, the feature of their
experimental design seems to have become a “standard” in conducting a cheap-talk game experiment in general
in the following senses. First, they apply lottery reward procedure that was ﬁrst developed by Roth and Malouf
(1979) andfurtherextended by Berg etal. (1986) toinduce risk-neutral utilityfunction from subjects. We randomly
assigned subjects into two groups of an equal size: direct reward condition and lottery reward condition. In the
27Table 8: Differences of Experimental Designs in Sessions 1-4
Session 1 2 3 4
Location Chuo Univ. Saitama Univ. Kyoto Sangyo Univ. Toyo Univ.
Date Feb. 2, 1999 May 18, 1999 July 14, 1999 Dec. 21, 1999
Sample 26 undergrads 13 undergrads 26 undergrads 26 undergrads
Rewarding Method direct/lottery direct direct direct
Labeling as in Table 1 premuted permuted permuted
Experimented Game 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 3 1, 3
lottery rewardcondition, subjectswere facedwitha two-prizelotterywhere thepayoff they earn wasproportionally
reﬂected in the probability of winning the higher prize. Secondly, Cooper et al. (1992b) and Cooper et al. (1992a)
carefully constructed a procedure for matching subjects.
The experimental result of the ﬁrst session led us to change the experimental procedure in three directions:
1. Since the experimental results in direct and lottery reward conditions did not differ signiﬁcantly in the ﬁrst
session, we decided to adopt direct reward method from the second session on;
2. In thepayoff tables used in the ﬁrst session, Receiver’s action A (B) was thebest response when the Sender’s
true type is A (B) respectively. To prevent the labels for the Receiver’s action from working as a coordination
device, we permuted the labels in sessions 2-4. For example, the action which was the best response for the
Receiver to type A (B) Sender was relabeled as action B (C) respectively and the best response to the prior
distribution was relabeled as A;
3. In the ﬁrst and second sessions, each subject was randomly assigned Games 1, 2, and 3. From the third
session on, we redesigned experiment so that each subject in a group faced the same game (Game 1 or 3)
throughout the session, although we tried to give each subject as equal opportunities as possible to be the
Sender or the Receiver, and to be type A or type B.
Table 8 summarizes those differences of experimental design by sessions. Instructors other than the authors of the
paper read aloud the instructions and conducted experiments manually. The instructors knew nothing about the
equilibria of the games.
Table 9 summarizes theexperimental data for Game 1 through Sessions 1-4. As noted in the Introduction in the
text, obvious tendency for a separating equilibrium play is observed. Table 10 summarizes the experimental data
for Game 2 through Sessions 1-2. Obviously, there is a tendency for a separating equilibrium play in this game
too. In the text, we used experimental data in Sessions 3 and 4 for the analysis of Game 3, because those sessions
28are focused on Game 3. Table 11 summarizes the experimental data for Game 3 in Sessions 1-2. It is easy to see
that the same tendency prevails in Sessions 1 and 2 as in Sessions 3 and 4.
Sender Receiver
t = A t = B m = a m = b
a b a b X Y Z X Y Z
Session 1, direct 12 1 0 13 11 0 1 0 13 1
Session 1, lottery 13 0 0 13 13 0 0 0 12 1
Session 2 12 1 0 13 10 0 2 1 1 12
Session 3 37 2 3 36 32 0 8 0 33 5
Session 4 38 1 1 38 36 0 3 0 37 2
Total 112 5 4 113 102 0 14 1 96 21
Table 9: Experimental Results for Game 1
Sender Receiver
t = A t = B m = a m = b
a b a b X Y Z X Y Z
Session 1, direct 10 3 0 13 5 1 4 2 11 3
Session 1, lottery 10 3 2 11 12 0 0 0 13 1
Session 2 11 2 2 11 7 0 6 4 0 9
Total 31 8 4 35 24 1 10 6 24 13
Table 10: Experimental Results for Game 2
Sender Receiver
t = A t = B m = a m = b
a b a b X Y Z X Y Z
Session 1, direct 12 1 7 6 14 0 5 0 5 2
Session 1, lottery 12 1 9 4 11 2 8 0 3 2
Session 2 10 3 7 6 8 5 4 2 1 0
Total 34 5 23 16 33 7 17 2 9 4
Table 11: Experimental Results for Game 3 in Sessions 1-2
C Instructions
This is an experiment on economic decision making. You can earn some amount of money in cash in this experi-
ment, if you make appropriate choices according to what is explained below.
In this experiment, each group consists of two persons, one of whom we call “S-player” and the other “R-
player.” Scores for both players are determined by choices of both players. We will not inform you who are
“S-players (R-players)” or who are matched with whom at each round. Matching is determined at random at each
round. In each round, one of you has to “wait” and do nothing until the next round.
We will repeat such an experimental round several times. When all the rounds ﬁnish, the instructors will tell
29you the end of experiment. Your reward is ﬁnally determined based on the score you earned all over the rounds.
More detailed experimental procedure follows.
C.1 Experimental Procedure
In this experiment, each round proceeds as follows:
1. Each of you are told whether you are an “S-player” or an “R-player” at this round.
2. If you are an “S-player,” you are also told whether you are type A or type B at this round.
3. “S-player” chooses between two alternatives “I am a type A” or “I am a type B.”
4. “R-player,” informed of the choice of “S-player” who is your matched opponent, chooses from among three
alternatives “A,” “B,” and “C.”
5. The score is determined according to thetype of “S-player,” which is assigned at thebeginning of this round,
and the choice by “R-player.”
6. The ﬁnal reward is determined based on the score you earned all over the rounds, and then paid in cash.
Let us see the details of each stage more closely.
Stage 1.
Each pair of subjects participate in each decision making, so there are 6 pairs and 1 person has to wait. One
subject of a pair is called “S-player,” while the other subject “R-player.” Throughout the experiment, you are
never told who and who match to form a pair. All that you are told is the number assigned to the pair to which
you belong and whether you are an “S-player” or “R-player.” All of these are predetermined according to some
random matching rule by the experimenters.
More speciﬁcally, at each round a “Payoff table” is distributed to each of those who participate in the experi-
ment. On the table, you will ﬁnd a payoff table and the number assigned to the pair to which you are belonging
at this round. We will later explain how to read the payoff table in more detail. If you are an “S-player,” “Answer
sheet” will also be distributed.
30Fill in the blank of your “Recording sheet” with the number of your pair that you have found on the “Answer
sheet.” Circle the letter “S” in the Player ﬁeld of your “Recording sheet” if you are an “S-player,” “R” if “R-
player.”
If you are told to wait at this round, write “wait” in the Pair ﬁeld of your “Recording sheet,” and wait silently
until the next round.
Stage 2
Look at the upper half of your “Answer sheet.” If you are told to be an “S-player” in Step 1, you are also told
whether you are type A or type B. Throughout the experiment, the probabilities of being type A and type B are
equal. No one except you knows whether you are type A or type B.
If you are an “S-player” and your type is A, circle the letter “A” in the Type ﬁeld of your “Recording sheet,”
likewise for the case that your type is B.
Stage 3
Those who are told to be an “S-player” in the Step 1 choose between “Alternative A” or “Alternative B.”
Alternative A: “I am a type A.”
Alternative B: “I am a type B.”
The choice is completely up to you. While the type of which you are informed in Step 2 will not be known to
the matched “R-player,” the choice you made in Step 2 will be known to the opponent.
If you choose “Alternative A,” circle the letter A in the Alternative ﬁeld on your “Recording sheet,” likewise
for the case that you choose “Alternative B.” Also do the same for the “Choice of S-player” ﬁeld in the lower half
of your “Answer sheet” and hand it to the instructors.
Stage 4
“R-player” chooses among “Alternative A,” “Alternative B,” and “Alternative C” knowing the choice made by
“S-player” in Step 3. You can ﬁnd the choice of the matched “S-player” on the “Answer sheet.”
If you choose “Alternative A,” circle the letter A in the Alternative ﬁeld on your “Recording sheet,” likewise
for the case that you choose “Alternative B” or “Alternative C.” Also do the same for the “Choice of R-player”
ﬁeld on the “Answer sheet” handed to you.
31Stage 5
Both players’scoresare determinedaccording tothe choice madeby “R-player”in Step 4and thetype revealed
to “S-player” in Step 2. Note that the choice by “S-player” in Step3 does not affect scores.
The score table shows you how both players’ scores are determined. The scores that both players get will be
shown separately on the blackboard, so ensure your score at each round. After ensuring your score, write it in the
Score ﬁeld on your “Recording sheet.”
Example.
Suppose you are distributed a payoff table as follows:
















If “S-player” is assigned type A in Step 2, look down under the column “type A” on this table. If “S-player” is
assigned type B, then look down under the column “type B.” The left digit in each cell indicates S-player’s score
and the right R-player’s.
For example, suppose “S-player” is told that his type is type A and “R-player’s” choice is “Alternative A,” then
“S-player” gets 90 and “R-player” gets 20 according to this payoff table. If “S-player” is told that his type is type
B and “R-player’s” choice is “Alternative B,” then “S-player” gets 10 and “R-player” gets 90.
Also suppose that “S-player” is told that his type is A and “S-player” chooses “Alternative B.” In this case, if
“R-player” chooses “Alternative A,” then “S-player” gets 90 and “R-player” gets 20. Next suppose that “S-player”
is told that his type is B and “S-player” chooses “Alternative B.” In this case, if “R-player” chooses “Alternative
A,” then “S-player” gets 60 and “R-player” gets 30.
Stage 6
32Steps 1-5 complete a round of the experiment. Your reward in cash in this round is ﬁfty Yen times the score
you get in this session. Fill in the Reward ﬁeld on your “Recording sheet” with the number that is 50 times as large
as the score in this round. The total reward in the experiment is the sum of each round’s reward plus participation
fee, a thousand Yen.
C.2 Notices
• Please be quiet throughout the experiment. You might be expelled if the instructor thinks it necessary. In
that case, you might not be rewarded.
• You cannot leave the room throughout the experiment in principle.
• Please turn off your pocket bell or cellular phone.
• Do not take anything used in the experiment with you.
C.3 Questions
If you have any question concerning the procedure of experiment, raise your hand quietly. An instructor will
answer your question in person. In some cases, the content of your question might disallow the instructor to
answer it, however.
C.4 Practice
Before conducting the experiment, we have three sessions for practice. These are purely for practice and theresults
therein will not be counted in your reward. You can always refer to these instructions throughout the experiment.
Please take out “Recording sheet (Practice)” from your envelope and ﬁll in your name and student ID.
We will distribute “Answer sheets (Practice)” and “Score table (Practice)” to those who are to be “S-players”
in this session. To those who are to be “R-players” in this session, only “Score table (Practice)“ will be distributed.
“S-players” shouldnow circletheletterSin thePlayerﬁeldof the“Recordingsheet(Practice)”and “R-players”
the letter R.
“S-players” now make their choice looking at your own type on the “Answer sheet (Practice)” and the “Payoff
table (Practice).” Mark your own type in the Type ﬁeld of your “Recording sheet (Practice)“ and also mark
33your choice in the Choice ﬁeld of the “Recording sheet (Practice).“ Next mark your choice on the “Answer sheet
(Practice)“ too. “Answer sheet (Practice)“ will be collected later.
Then the lower half of the “Answer sheet (Practice),” on which “S-players” have already marked their choices,
will be distributed to the matched “R-players.” “R-players” can thus see the choice of “S-players,” but not their
true types. “R-players” should now make choice by examining the score table and mark your choice in the Choice
ﬁeld of your “Recording sheet (Practice).“ Also mark your choice on the “Answer sheet (Practice).“
Let us now turn to actual experiment. Please ﬁll in your name and student ID on your “Recording sheet.”
34D Recording Sheet
Recording Sheet
Name( ) Student ID( )
Round Pair No. Player Type Alternative Payoff Reward
1 S/R A/B A/B/C
2 S/R A/B A/B/C
3 S/R A/B A/B/C
4 S/R A/B A/B/C
5 S/R A/B A/B/C
6 S/R A/B A/B/C
7 S/R A/B A/B/C
8 S/R A/B A/B/C
9 S/R A/B A/B/C
10 S/R A/B A/B/C
11 S/R A/B A/B/C
12 S/R A/B A/B/C
13 S/R A/B A/B/C
* Multiply the number in the Payoff ﬁeld by 50 and put the resultant number into the Reward ﬁeld.
35E Various Reﬁnement Concepts for Cheap-Talk Games
First we set notations for describing a general cheap-talk game. A generic cheap-talk game can be represented by
a sextuple  T,π,M,C,uS,uR , where T is the ﬁnite set of the Sender’s types, π is a prior distribution over T, M is
the set of messages, C is the set of actions for the Receiver, and uS : C×T → R and uR : C×T → R are payoff
functions for the Sender and the Receiver respectively. Let ∆M and ∆C denote probability distributions over the set
of messages and the set of actions respectively. A strategy of the Sender is a function µ : T → ∆M. Let ΣS denote
the set of Sender’s strategies. A strategy of the Receiver is a function ρ : M → ∆C. Let ΣR denote the set of the











Let β(m) denote the Receiver’s belief upon receiving message m. We also use β(t|m) to denote the probability that
β(m) assigns to type t. Let the set of best responses for the Receiver with this belief be denoted by BRR(β(m)).





for every m ∈ M,ρ(m) ∈ BRR(β(m)), and for every t and for every ˆ µ ∈ ΣS,u S(µ,ρ|t)≥ uS(ˆ µ,ρ|t).
Assuming that there is a common language between the Sender and the Receiver, for every empty subset K
of T, there exists a message ‘K’ with literal meaning that “I belong to K,” Farrell (1993) proposes the following
reﬁnement theory. Consider an equilibrium and call a message that is not used in equilibrium a “neologism.” Let
the original sequential equilibrium be (µ,ρ,β). When the set of types K ⊂ T send a neologism ‘K’ to the Receiver,
36and the Receiver believes this message, it will induce the following belief β(‘K’).
β(t|‘K’)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
π(t)/∑s∈Kπ(s) if t ∈ K
0i f t / ∈ K
A neologism ‘K’ is said to be credible relative to equilibrium (µ,ρ,β)if the following conditions hold.
C1’: uS(ρ|t)> uS(µ,ρ|t) for all t ∈ K and ρ ∈ BRR(β(’K’)),
C2’: uS(ρ|t)≤ uS(µ,ρ|t) for all t / ∈ K and ρ ∈ BRR(β(’K’)).
Deﬁnition E.2 (neologism-proofness) A neologism-proof equilibrium is an equilibrium relative to which there
exists no credible neologism.
By deﬁnition, if an equilibrium is neologism-proof, then all the equilibria with the same outcome function are
also neologism-proof. In all the sequential equilibria in Game 3, type A Sender can send a credible neologism with
the meaning that “I’m type A.” Thus they are not neologism-proof. Therefore Game 3 has no neologism-proof
equilibria.
In neologism-proofness, it is assumed that all the types that attempt to deviate, called the set of deviant types,
send the same single message. Mathews et al. (1991) improve upon neologism-proof by considering deviation as
a map from the set of deviant types to the set of deviation messages and imposing consistency conditions on this
mapping.
An announcement strategy is a pair d =  δ,D , where D is a nonempty set of deviant types and d : D → ∆M
is a talking strategy. Let the set of messages that are sent with positive probability by δ be denoted as δ(D).A n
anouncement is a pair  m,d , where m ∈ δ(D). Denote the Receiver’s belief when he believes an announcement
 m,d  be denoted as β(m,d). For each t ∈ T and each m ∈ δ(D), this is deﬁned as
β(t|m,d)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
π(t)δ(m|t)/∑s∈Dπ(s)δ(m|s) if t ∈ D
0i f t / ∈ D
37Suppose the Receiver with the above belief plays a best response and let the minimum and maximum payoff to the
type t Sender be denoted by
uS(m,d|t)=min{uS(ρ|t): ρ ∈ BRR(β(m,d))},and
¯ uS(m,d|t)=max{uS(ρ|t) : ρ ∈ BRR(β(m,d))}
respectively. Consider anequilibrium (µ,ρ,β)and an announcement strategy d = δ,D ,and supposethey together
satisfy the following conditions.
C1 For each t ∈ D and for each m ∈ δ({t}), uS(m,d|t)≥ uS(µ,ρ|t) and strict inequality holds for some t ∈ D and
m ∈ δ({t}).
C2 For each t ∈ T \D and for each m ∈ δ(D),¯ uS(m,d|t)≤ uS(µ,ρ|t).
C3 For each t ∈ D, for each m ∈ δ({t}), and for each ˆ m ∈ δ(D)\{m}, uS(m,d|t)≥ uS( ˆ m,d|t).
A announcement strategy d =  δ,D  and a corresponding announcement  m,d  are said to be weakly credible
relative to equilibrium (µ,ρ,β)if they satisfy C1-C3.
Deﬁnition E.3 (strong announcement-proofness) A strongly announcement-proof equilibrium is an equilibrium
relative to which there exists no weakly credible announcement.
When δ:D→M is constant valued,theabove deﬁnition coincideswiththat of acredibleneologism. Therefore,
a credible neologism is a weakly credible announcemnet. This means a strongly announcement-proof equilibrium
is neologism-proof. Therefore our Game 3 does not have a strongly announcement-proof equilibrium.
A stronger notion of credibility can be deﬁned by further requiring C4 below. An announcement strategy
d =  δ,D  and a corresponding announcement  m,d  is said to be credible relative to (µ,ρ,β) if they together
satisfy C1-C4.
C4 If d  =  δ ,D   also satisﬁes C1-C3 relative to (µ,ρ,β), then for each t ∈ D∩D , for each m ∈ δ({t}), and for
each m  ∈ δ ({t}), uS(m,d|t)≥ ¯ uS(m ,d |t).
Deﬁnition E.4 (announcement-proofness) An announcement-proof equilibrium is an equilibrium relative to
which there exists no credible announcement.
38Obviously, a strongly announcement-proof equilibrium is announcement-proof. In Game 3, there is just one
announcement strategy that satisﬁes C1-C3, and thus C4 is satisﬁed trivially. Therefore all thesequential equilibria
in Game 3 are not announcement-proof.
As is stated in the text, Mathews et al. (1991) proposes another concept in response to Stiglitz critique. This
requires a credible message to satisfy further the following condition.
C3A There exist a strategy ˆ δ : T \D → ∆M with δ(D)∩ ˆ δ(T \D)=/ 0, the Receiver’s strategy ˆ ρ and belief ˆ β such
that (ˆ µ, ˆ ρ, ˆ β) is an equilibrium, where ˆ µ =( δ,ˆ δ).
C4’ If d  =  δ ,D   also satisﬁes C1-C3 and C3A relative to (µ,ρ,β), for every t ∈ D∩D , for every m ∈ δ({t}),
and for every m  ∈ δ ({t}), uS(m,d|t)≥ ¯ uS(m ,d |t).
An announcementstrategy d = δ,D andits corresponding announcement  m,d is saidto bestrongly credible
relative to equilibrium (µ,ρ,β)if they satisfy C1-C3, C3A and C4’.
Deﬁnition E.5 (weak announcement-proofness) A weakly announcement-proof equilibrium is an equilibrium
relative to which there exists no strongly credible announcement.
By deﬁnition, an announcement-proof equilibrium is also weakly announcement-proof. Obviously, the devi-
ation announcement by type A in our Game 3 does not satisfy C3A. Thus babbling equilibria in Game 3 are all
weakly announcement-proof.
The concepts of recurrent set and recurrent equilibrium proposed by Rabin and Sobel (1996) are explained in
some detail in the text. Here we give a rigorous deﬁnition of partial common interests that we omitted in the text.
Let BRR(K) denote the set of Receiver’s actions that can be a best response to some probability distribution
over a nonempty subset K ⊆ T. Also let uS(t,L) denote the minimum expected payoff that the type t Sender
earns when the Receiver choose among BRR(K). Let BRR(K,π) denote the set of Receiver’s best actions when
he Bayes-update the prior belief concentrating on K. Denote by uP
s (t) the type t Sender’s expected payoff in a
babbling equilibrium.
Deﬁnition E.6 (partial common interests) A cheap-talk game has partial common interests if there exists a par-
tition J1,···,Jj of T such that:
1. for all ti ∈ Ji, and for all Jk  = Ji,u S(ti,Ji) > max{us(ti,ak) : ak ∈ BRR(Jk)};
392. for each i, there exists ai ∈ BRR(Ji,π) such that uS(ti,ai) > uP
s (t) for all ti ∈ Ji; and
3. If L∩Jk  = / 0 for at least two k, then for each a ∈ BRR(L) there exists an i and ti ∈ L∩Ji such that uS(ti,Ji) >
uS(ti,a).
It is obvious that Game 3 does not have partial common interests. Note that the condition 2 above does not
allow the trivial partition {T} to be a qualiﬁed partition.
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